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Introduction
The 1990s were a time of unprecedented
economic growth and prosperity in the United
States and many other countries around the
world. In Turkey, however, sustained economic
growth was severely hampered by rampant infla-
tion following its continued efforts to liberal-
ize its economy. According to World Develop-
ment Indicators, Turkey’s GDP grew from $151
billion in 1990 to $267 billion in 2000,1 despite
a significant downturn in the middle of the
decade. However, during this period annual
inflation rates in Turkey ranged from 55 percent
to 106 percent. (Togan and Ersel, p. 3) In 1999
Turkey’s newly elected government sought the
advice and financial assistance of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) in preparing an
economic program with the primary goal of
freeing the Turkish economy from the prob-
lem of inflation that had plagued the nation
for over twenty years. (Önal and Erçel, 1999,
par. 1)
The program aimed to curb inflation by
reducing interest rates through several initia-
tives, including the strengthening of the coun-
try’s banking system and increased banking reg-
ulation. The program was well supported by
Turkish and international investors, and in 2000
the annual inflation rate fell from over 60 per-
cent to 33 percent. (Kumcu, p. 2) This posi-
tive start quickly deteriorated, however, as
Turkey’s banking sector experienced significant
crises in November 2000 and February 2001.
The disinflationary program became controver-
sial as it was considered by many to be a major
factor contributing to the financial crises. The
program’s critics included Erkan Kumcu, a for-
mer vice-governor of the Central Bank of
Turkey, who argues that the IMF failed to prop-
erly identify and react to market conditions lead-
ing up to the crises. Despite controversy over
actions leading up to the financial crises, it is
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clear that improving the structure and regula-
tion of the banking sector was a major part of
the IMF initiative in Turkey before and after the
crises.
This article discusses the positive steps
taken by the Turkish government to improve
banking regulations prior to the financial mar-
ket turmoil in 2000 and analyzes efforts to
improve the capital adequacy of banks through
stricter regulation. In addition, it examines
the Banking Sector Restructuring Program that
was the main response to the crises and evalu-
ates the program’s effect on competition and
efficiency within the banking system. Finally,
the article considers important issues facing
Turkey’s financial industry in 2010 and beyond.
Initial Actions
Improvements in the regulatory frame-
work of Turkey’s banking sector began prior to
the crises in 2000 and 2001. The Banking Reg-
ulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was cre-
ated by the nation’s parliament in June 1999.
This was important, for the BRSA became the
primary regulator of the nation’s banks as it took
control of duties previously performed by enti-
ties under the control of both the Treasury and
Central Bank. Revisions and improvements to
capital adequacy regulations were made over the
next several years as a result of BRSA policy,
including the main response to the financial
crises that would follow in 2000 and 2001. In
addition, the laws governing the operation of the
deposit insurance organization known as the
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) were
amended, and this organization was placed
under the control of the newly-formed BRSA.
The actions taken in 1999 and 2000 to improve
the regulation of Turkey’s banks were unsuccess-
ful in preventing the crises the country faced
at the end of 2000; however, they served as an
essential first phase in the reform of banking sec-
tor regulation and created the regulatory struc-
ture necessary to prepare an effective restructur-
ing plan to promote recovery.
Establishment of the Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Agency
Following the agency’s formation, sev-
eral steps to improve the performance of the
BRSA were taken by the Turkish government
with the full support of the IMF, leading up to
the BRSA becoming fully operational in August
2000. These improvements focused primarily on
twomajor issues facing the BRSA in its first year
of operation — the low level of transparency
within the agency and its level of independ-
ence from the influence of outside parties,
specifically government officials. These issues
were identified in Turkey’s December 9, 1999,
Letter of Intent to the IMF as specific areas
targeted for improvement through banking law
amendments planned for 2000. These amend-
ments were made in accordance with time-
lines set forth in the Letter. The degree of
independence of the agency was increased by
removing the input of the Council of Minis-
ters in banking supervision beyond the appoint-
ment of members of the BRSA board, and this
was a vital improvement that allowed for more
effective and efficient operation.
The original BRSA board was appointed in
March 2000. According to banking law, mem-
bers of the board serve six-year renewable terms.
Each member of the seven-person board is
required to have significant work or academic
experience (at least ten years beyond undergrad-
uate study), and candidates may come from two
distinct areas — former financial institution
executives or experts from academia. (“Banking
Law No. 5411,” p. 36) Encouraging the appoint-
ment of board members from both academia
and industry promotes increased diversity of
thought and reduces the effects of “groupthink”
among board members, which is a significant
obstacle to the effective operation of a regula-
tory body.
The regulations regarding election of
BRSA board members show Turkey’s dedication
to removing outside influences, such as elected
officials and private sector financial institutions,
from the regulatory process. The six-year term
length is significant in that it is longer than the
term length of other elected officials (e.g., mem-
bers of parliament), which lessens the tempta-
tions of short term political gain. In addition,
board members may not be employed by any
outside organization while employed by the
BRSA and must be at least two years removed
from employment in the banking sector. Also,
board members must immediately sell or trans-
fer all personally held shares of ownership in
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financial institutions. Failure to comply with
these regulations is considered to be a resig-
nation from the BRSA board. (“Banks Act No.
4389,” p. 3)
The importance of a single, autonomous
regulatory agency should not be discounted.
Such an organization, in my opinion, is the
most effective and unbiased way to regulate
an industry, since the conflicting interests of
elected officials and private-sector banking rep-
resentatives can be impediments to efficient reg-
ulation. The process of establishing the BRSA
and refining the laws governing the organiza-
tion followed a detailed timeline endorsed by the
IMF, and Turkey was able to adhere to this time-
line and to successfully meet most self-imposed
deadlines. The BRSA became fully operational
in August 2000 following the establishment
process. The timely enactment of each piece
of the BRSA’s regulatory framework shows
that Turkey considered this initiative a prior-
ity in its overall plan to reshape its economy.
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund
Another step taken by the Turkish govern-
ment to improve the regulatory framework prior
to the 2000 and 2001 crises in financial markets
was a reworking of the laws governing the oper-
ation of the SDIF. The SDIF was founded in 1983
to insure savings deposits in banks under the
control of the Central Bank, and from 1994 on
it was given responsibility for improving the
financial positions of struggling banks when
necessary. (“Deposit Insurance and the Differ-
ential Premium System in Turkey,” p. 5) As part
of the disinflationary program, control of the
SDIF was shifted to the BRSA; and beginning in
2000 the SDIF was required to seize all banks
deemed insolvent by the BRSA and either to take
the necessary steps for liquidation or to restruc-
ture them for sale in full or in part. (Erelçin)
Also, the SDIF was no longer permitted to
provide liquidity to any banks other than those
in its control. (Önal and Erçel, 1999, par. 55–56)
In my opinion, the orderly restructuring
of an insolvent bank is a requirement in mod-
ern financial markets as it protects depositors
and creditors who are the sources of the funds
needed for bank operation. This was recognized
by both Turkish and IMF authorities as they
developed the disinflationary program. The
changes to the operation of the SDIF laid the
foundation for orderly restructuring that pro-
tects bank assets that are claimed by its lenders
(depositors and creditors). In addition, the
takeover of insolvent banks plays a role in the
discipline of banking executives and manage-
ment teams as they make decisions regarding
risk-taking in the future.
The SDIF played a significant role
throughout the process of banking reform, with
eight banks falling under its control by May
2000 before the worst of the financial turmoil.
As the BRSA became operational, it took con-
trol of the SDIF (still funded by the Treasury);
and the plans implemented by the BRSA regard-
ing restructuring insolvent institutions were a
top priority of the Banking Sector Restructur-
ing Program, as is explained in later sections.
Reworking the laws governing the SDIF and
redefining its function in order to more effi-
ciently and effectively address insolvent banks
were positive steps taken through the disinfla-
tionary program.
Capital Adequacy
Through the newly formed BRSA, amend-
ments and additions to banking law attempted
to address several other important issues facing
the banking sector. Chief among these was the
capital adequacy of financial institutions. Cap-
ital adequacy of banks is a major issue in the
regulatory framework of every nation, with
national regulators establishing minimum cap-
ital requirements, most often through the use
of a capital adequacy ratio that creates a model
for determining the level of risk associated with
each type of asset held by the institution. Forc-
ing banks and other financial institutions to
meet minimum capital requirements allows
institutions to maintain solvency in the event
that losses of a sizeable magnitude occur in
the future.
Reduction of risk among banks through
more stringent capital requirements was a
part of the original IMF-sponsored disinflation-
ary program. In the December 1999 Letter of
Intent to the IMF, it is stated that Turkish
authorities intended to “by end-June 2000 . . .
amend capital adequacy rules to take into
account market risks” and to require all banks
with unsatisfactory capital adequacy ratios to
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“present and adhere to time-bound programs
for strengthening their capital positions.” (Önal
and Erçel, 1999, par. 54)
In the first half of 2000, Turkey imple-
mented the legislation it proposed in the
December 1999 Letter of Intent. Banks were
required to incorporate market risks, including
interest rate and equity risk, into their calcu-
lations of capital levels for regulatory pur-
poses. (Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu, p. 170) Stronger for-
eign exchange exposure limits were also
introduced prior to establishment of the BRSA
as the Central Bank introduced a provision
requiring banks to completely offset foreign
exchange positions above certain limits by
increasing reserves. (Önal and Erçel, 2000,
par. 26) These are examples of significant
improvements to capital adequacy regulation
made in Turkey during the early stages of the
disinflationary program. Other minor amend-
ments to capital adequacy rules within the bank-
ing law became fully effective in January 2002
after substantial delays and multiple missed
deadlines. (Dervis and Serdengeçti, 2002,
par. 35)
Despite several positive actions taken as
part of the disinflationary program, it is clear
that capital adequacy rules remained a weakness
of the Turkish banking regulatory framework.
The financial crises of 2000 and 2001, as well as
actions taken during the period from 2003 to
2007 to meet international capital adequacy
standards, provide strong evidence in support
of the claim that capital adequacy regulations
in Turkey were not stringent enough. Not sur-
prisingly, in the immediate aftermath of the
crises, the undercapitalization of institutions in
the banking sector was a major issue and con-
cern. The SDIF took control of ten banks
between October 27, 2000, and July 9, 2001
(“Banks Managed by the Savings Deposit Insur-
ance Fund . . . ,” p. 2); but the 27 private banks
that remained outside of SDIF control (along
with state-owned banks) were experiencing their
own capital problems in 2001. Regulations
requiring undercapitalized banks to submit
time-bound recapitalization plans were put into
effect; and in June 2001 the BRSA set a target
date of December 31, 2001, for all private banks
to be in compliance with minimum capital ade-
quacy regulations. (Dervis and Serdengeçti,
2001, par. 12) Despite difficulties experienced by
private banks meeting the deadlines set forth by
the BRSA, by May 1, 2002, the majority of pri-
vate banks had met minimum capital require-
ments. (Thompson et al., p. 1) However, it
appears that in 2002 Turkey’s minimum capi-
tal requirements were not sufficient when com-
pared to international standards.
In May 2002, Fitch Ratings’ analysts
thought that, despite meeting minimum capi-
tal requirements, Turkish private banks were
undercapitalized when compared with inter-
national standards. (Thompson et al., p. 1) Much
of the concern raised by these analysts was a
result of conservatism in a highly volatile, post-
crisis environment, but many of the issues
raised in their report about the regulatory
guidelines regarding bank capital are observa-
tions that could have been and should have been
considered in the original disinflationary pro-
gram. The Fitch Ratings analysts’ report notes
that the risks associated with certain assets
are not properly accounted for in capital ade-
quacy calculations. Specifically, Turkish treas-
ury securities and other government bonds
are assigned a risk rating of zero under Turk-
ish capital regulations; this is a questionable
practice when Turkey’s sovereign rating of “B”
is considered. Additionally, the report stated that
it was possible to circumvent new regulations
forcing loans made to large owners (defined as
owning 10 percent or more of capital) to be
deducted from the capital base when calculat-
ing capitalization levels. (Thompson et al., p. 3)
The report also questioned certain aspects of the
standardized market risk measurement method
employed by banks to estimate market risk
under the legislation introduced in 2001.
It is clear that, despite Turkey’s apparent
commitment to strict capital requirements for
its banks, several areas for improvement existed
prior to the crises of 2000 and 2001. In the years
after the recovery, Turkey adopted capital ade-
quacy standards more in line with international
norms established by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision as the nation considered
potential accession to the European Union.
Banking Sector Restructuring Program
In May 2001 the BRSA introduced the
Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP)
as a direct response to the crises of 2000 and
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2001. The program sought to restructure the
three broad types of banks in the market: state-
owned banks, private banks, and those under the
control of the SDIF. As a result, the major stated
objectives of the BSRP were the strengthening
of private banks, the swift resolution of SDIF-
controlled banks, and a complete restructur-
ing of the public banking system. The BRSA also
described the main pillars of the program as:
“1) financial and operational restructuring of
the banking sector, and 2) further improvement
of banking regulation and supervision in order
to promote efficiency and competition in the
banking sector.” (“Banking Sector Restructur-
ing Program Press Release,” p. 1) These pillars
provide a framework for the program’s intended
function through which the success of the
program can be analyzed. Clearly, the end result
of the restructuring program if properly imple-
mented is a reorganized, more efficient, and
more competitive banking sector capable of
driving future economic growth.
Resolution of Banks under SDIF
Control
The SDIF played a key role in Turkey’s
response to the 2000 and 2001 crises, and it was
a major tool used by the BRSA during the
process of restructuring the banking sector.
From 1997 to 2003, the SDIF seized control
of 20 banks under the provisions of banking
law. (“Banking Sector Restructuring Program:
Progress Report — (VII),” p. 17) Eight of these
banks were transferred to the SDIF in 2001,
during the immediate aftermath of the crises.
Also, during 2001 the SDIF managed to remove
several banks from its control through merg-
ers, sales, or liquidation — an important point
considering the fact that no SDIF-controlled
banks had been removed from SDIF control
during the previous four years. (“Banking
Sector Restructuring Program: Progress
Report,” p. 12) The BSRP can be credited with
encouraging the swift resolution of SDIF-
controlled banks, as it established a framework
for the resolution process. The restructuring
and resolution strategy had several main ele-
ments, including financial restructuring and
operational restructuring of SDIF-controlled
banks. (“Banking Sector Restructuring Pro-
gram: Progress Report,” p. 11)
Through its actions, the SDIF made it
clear that the preferred outcome for banks under
its control was ultimately a sale to an outside
investor. Theoretically, in cases when this was not
possible, the SDIF had the option of withdraw-
ing all banking licenses and forcing the liquida-
tion process; however, legal obstaclesmade liqui-
dation a difficult and often impossible outcome.
(“Banking Sector Restructuring Program:
Progress Report— (VII),” p. 23) As a result, “tran-
sition banks” were introduced and were created
through the merger of several SDIF-controlled
banks to be restructured and sold at a later date.
By October 2003 the total cost of the finan-
cial restructuring of banks taken over by the
SDIF was $22.5 billion, of which over 75 per-
cent was funded through public sector resources
(the remaining cost was covered by SDIF
resources including fees paid by registered
banks). (“Banking Sector Restructuring Pro-
gram: Progress Report — (VII),” p. 26) The
injection of foreign-exchange-indexed treas-
ury securities allowed the open foreign
exchange (FX) positions of SDIF-controlled
banks to be reduced from $4.5 billion in May
2001 (when the BSRP was announced) to $561
million by the end of June 2001. (“Banking Sec-
tor Restructuring Program: Progress Report —
(VII),” p. 28) Despite the seizure of additional
banks, the open FX position of SDIF banks stood
at $408 million in January 2002. (“Banking Sec-
tor Restructuring Program: Progress Report,”
p. 13) These FX positions became significant lia-
bilities following the decision to float the Turk-
ish lira in late February 2001, which was fol-
lowed by an overnight depreciation of 25
percent. In addition to significantly reducing FX
exposure, SDIF-controlled banks were able to
eliminate short-term liabilities by selling gov-
ernment bonds to the Central Bank. (“Bank-
ing Sector Restructuring Program: Progress
Report,” pp. 13–14) These efforts to improve the
financial positions of insolvent banks, while a
large financial burden to Turkey’s treasury, elim-
inated much of the immediate threat of insol-
vency of the banks seized by the SDIF.
The operational restructuring strategy that
the BSRA put into place through the BSRP
involved significant reductions in the number
of branches and personnel of seized banks. At
the time of their transfer to the SDIF, the 20
seized banks had 1,815 branches and 37,889
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employees. Through the restructuring process
265 branches were directly sold, and 851 bank
branches were shut down. (“Banking Sector
Restructuring Program: Progress Report —
(VII),” pp. 29–30) In addition, the total num-
ber of employees was reduced by 43 percent
by the end of January 2002. (“Banking Sector
Restructuring Program: Progress Report,” p. 14)
These statistics show the level of commitment
made by the BRSA and the SDIF to improving
efficiency and reducing waste in the banking
system. Given the desperate situations of many
of the SDIF-controlled banks, across-the-board
restructuring was necessary and led to reduc-
tion in costs that increased the viability of many
of the institutions.
The elimination of short-term liabilities,
the reduction of FX exposure, and the decrease
in the number of branches and employees sig-
nificantly improved the financial position and
cost burden of banks under SDIF control. The
steps taken by the program resulted in several
positive outcomes, including the sale of Sümer-
bank to the OYAK Group in August 2001, the
sale of Demirbank to HSBC (a British finan-
cial institution), and the sale of Sitebank to
the Italian firm Novabank. (“Banking Sector
Restructuring Program: Progress Report,” p. 12)
Overall, eight of the original banks taken over
by the SDIF were sold in 2001, and the Sitebank
sale was completed in January 2002. However,
attempts to liquidate or sell many other banks
failed, with legal action being the main obstacle
to the liquidation process. As a result, the
need for transition banks, which were created
through mergers of several SDIF-controlled
banks, arose. The sale of the first transition
bank, Sümerbank, was a major success; but
the other transition bank, Bayındırbank,
remained unresolved for several years.
The resolution of insolvent banks in the
aftermath of the crises was expensive and not
without problems. However, the SDIF proved
capable of handling the issues surrounding
the seizure and restructuring of insolvent finan-
cial institutions. This is important for the Turk-
ish banking sector, as the capability of the SDIF
to seize and efficiently restructure insolvent
institutions acts as a deterrent to excessive risk-
taking by bank executives and managers while
also maximizing shareholder and bondholder
value preserved in the event of insolvency.
Competition and Efficiency in the
Banking System
As publicly stated at the outset of the
BSRP, the BRSA hoped that its efforts in
response to the 2000 and 2001 crises would
allow the banking sector to emerge from the
financial turmoil as a more efficient and com-
petitive system. The importance of the banking
sector to the overall economy in Turkey cannot
be overlooked, as all modern economies rely on
the movement of funds through financial mar-
kets. Evidence of the importance of financial
systems for economic growth includes the fail-
ure of financial institutions and freezing of
credit markets in the United States and around
the world in 2008 which led directly to a world-
wide recession. As a result, an increase in effi-
ciency and competition in the sector would
prove to be extremely beneficial to the Turk-
ish economy. Therefore, in an analysis of the
results of the restructuring program it is pru-
dent to consider trends in efficiency and
competitiveness.
One often-cited measure of bank efficiency
is the cost efficiency concept. Studies conducted
to determine the cost efficiency of a bank
attempt to quantify how well a bank is using
its available resources to conduct its business.
Matousek, Dasci, and Sergi (2008) analyzed
the cost efficiency of three state-owned banks
and twenty private banks in Turkey from
2000–2005. Their sample covers almost the
entire banking sector, as the 23 banks studied
controlled 99 percent of the banking system’s
assets. (Matousek et al., p. 344) The study’s
results, which are summarized in Table 1, show
that a steady improvement in cost efficiency
occurred among state-owned banks, private
banks, foreign banks, and the banking system
as a whole. Interestingly, the state-owned banks
were comparatively more efficient over the
period. The authors attribute this to the large
size of the state banks, the lower price of labor
available to the state banks, and the relatively
hard budget constraints imposed on state banks.
(Matousek et al., pp. 348–49) The authors also
acknowledge that the analysis “unambigu-
ously indicates that the Turkish Banking Sys-
tem has a large potential for improvement” in
the area of efficiency. (Matousek et al., p. 352)
However, the most important conclusion to be
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drawn from their study is that, as the banking
system emerged from the crises with the aid
of the BRSA’s restructuring program, a steady
increase in efficiency occurred.
As the efficiency of the banking system
increased during the operation of the restruc-
turing program, the sector was also becoming
more concentrated. As shown in Table 2 (Panel
A), the total number of banks in the sector
decreased from 61 in 2001 to 47 in 2005. The
reduction in the number of banks operating
in Turkey was not unexpected, since the BSRP
encouraged merger and acquisition activities
through its strategies employed by the SDIF and
through tax incentives. (Abbasog˘lu et al., p. 5)
Further evidence of increased concentra-
tion is provided by Abbasog˘lu, Aysan and Günes¸
(2007) who analyze the degree of competition
from 2001–2005 using three separate measures:
the percentage of total banking sector assets
controlled by the largest three banks (C3), the
total percentage of banking sector assets con-
trolled by the largest five banks (C5), and the
well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
as measures of the degree of concentration.
All three indices increased over the period, as
shown in Table 2 (Panel B), indicating a trend
toward increasing concentration. Abbasog˘lu
et al. also provide H-statistic2 calculations to
determine the level of competition in the bank-
ing sector over the same period. As shown in
Table 2 (Panel C), two similar models produce
H-statistics between 0 and 1, which indicates
that the banking sector experienced monopo-
listic competition over the entire period.
(Abbasog˘lu et al., p. 12) Therefore, it appears
that despite the significant merger and acquisi-
tion activity that occurred following the crises,
which was encouraged as part of the restructur-
ing program, the banking system managed to
remain in a state of monopolistic competition
and not one that is overly concentrated.
The studies summarized in this section
strongly suggest that through the BSRP, Turk-
ish authorities managed to increase efficiency
and promote merger and acquisition activity
to salvage the assets of struggling institutions
without making overly significant sacrifices in
the area of competition. In addition, the recov-
ery of Turkey’s financial sector following the
restructuring program created opportunities for
recovery of the economy as a whole, with the
nation experiencing average annual GDP growth
of 7.2 percent from 2002–2006. (Çimenog˘lu et
al., p. 185) The financial stability during this
period allowed for the policies implemented as
part of the disinflationary program (including
fiscal policy controls and a free-floating Turkish
lira) to take hold, resulting in average annual
inflation from 2002–2006 of only 15.0 per-
cent. Inflation rates decreased significantly dur-
ing the post-crisis period; and a 6.5 percent
annual inflation rate was achieved in 2009.
(Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey;
Çimeno g˘lu et al., p. 185) It is clear that the
more efficient, stable banking sector that
emerged following the BSRP had a positive
impact on the entire Turkish economy, as the
policy decisions made by the BRSA encour-
aged a strong banking sector capable of fuel-
ing economic growth.
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Table 1
Bank Efficiency Estimates (maximum 100%)
All Banks State-owned Private Foreign
2000 75.6% 83.6% 74.6% 73.5%
2001 79.0% 86.0% 78.1% 77.1%
2002 82.0% 88.1% 81.2% 80.0%
2003 84.5% 89.9% 83.9% 83.1%
2004 86.8% 91.4% 86.3% 85.5%
2005 88.9% 92.8% 88.3% 87.7%
Source: Matousek et al., p. 349.
2Defined as the sum of the factor price elasticities
of interest revenue with respect to capital, labor, and
physical capital.
Issues Facing the Banking Sector In
the Future
As part of Turkey’s bid to become a mem-
ber of the European Union (EU), the Turkish
government has launched several economic ini-
tiatives aimed at meeting EU requirements
and standards. These initiatives include compli-
ance with EU banking legislation, which par-
allels standards developed by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision. (Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu,
p. 170) The Basel Committee develops and pub-
lishes standards with the goal of improving
the quality of banking supervision worldwide,
including the Basel II Framework regarding
capital adequacy requirements and measures.
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) Fol-
lowing the introduction of the BSRP, Turkey
began making plans to fulfill the requirements
of Basel II and the accompanying EU directives.
In 2003 six large Turkish banks took part in
the third Quantitative Impact Study (under
BRSA supervision) in order to determine the
potential impact of the enactment of Basel II
policies; and plans were made to implement the
EU equivalent legislation by 2007. (Pazarba -
s¸ıog˘lu, pp. 171–72) Turkey’s government and the
BRSA made a firm commitment to meet inter-
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Table 2
Panel A: Number of Operating Banks in Turkish Banking System
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sector Total 61 54 50 48 47
Commercial 46 40 36 35 34
State-owned 3 3 3 3 3
Privately-owned 22 20 18 18 17
Foreign 15 15 13 13 13
SDIF-controlled 6 2 2 1 1
Non-Depository 15 14 14 13 13
State-owned 3 3 3 3 3
Privately-owned 9 8 8 8 7
Foreign 3 3 3 2 3
Panel B: Concentration Indices (maximum 1.0)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
C3 0.370727 0.403774 0.429238 0.425586 0.456325
C5 0.475055 0.488920 0.493417 0.489567 0.534048
HHI 0.083636 0.088299 0.094170 0.094883 0.098053
Panel C: H-Statistics1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Model 12 0.5650542 0.2438027 0.1830553 0.1814690 0.1923365
Model 23 0.5975753 0.4919328 0.5785956 0.1884205 0.3922842
Source: Abbasog˘lu et al., pp. 7, 11–12.
1
H-Statistic computation uses the following inputs: a) unit price of loanable funds, b) unit price of labor, c) unit price of
capital.
2
Model 1 uses the following unit price approximations: a) ratio of annual interest expenses to total funds, b) ratio of
annual personnel expenses to number of employees, c) ratio of physical capital expenditure to total prices.
3
Model 2 uses the following unit price approximations: a) ratio of annual interest expenses to total deposits, b) ratio of
annual personnel expenses to total assets, c) ratio of other operations and administrative expenses to total assets.
national standards, and legislation introduced
in 2005 put the country in full compliance with
Basel II guidelines. (Çimenog˘lu et al., p. 190)
This legislation focused primarily on improving
corporate governance rules and internal risk
control, and its quick implementation is a prod-
uct of Turkey’s commitment to compliance with
international standards as it continues the EU
accession process going forward.
In September 2009, in response to the
global financial crisis that began in 2008, the
Basel Committee met with central bank gov-
ernors and other officials from around the world
to develop a comprehensive set of regulations
and supervisory policies aimed at improving
banking supervision. It remains to be seen if
regulatory legislation in the EU, and else-
where around the world, will be amended in
response to the global financial crisis and
Basel Committee recommendations. As a result,
changes to EU directives regarding Turkey’s
banking regulation are unknown; but as of 2009
Turkey’s banking sector has met all EU acces-
sion requirements and the banking industry is
not an obstacle to potential accession.
In the aftermath of the 2000 and 2001
crises, the banking sector experienced increased
consolidation. However, since 2005 the number
of banks operating in Turkey has not changed
considerably; and as of 2009 there are a total
of 45 banks in the system, compared with 47
in 2005. During the next several years, there
is a distinct possibility of another phase of
consolidation (Sabancı Dinçer) through merg-
ers and acquisitions, as domestic banks look
to expand and foreign banks enter the market.
The BRSA will need to play a role in prevent-
ing problems that can arise from too much con-
solidation, namely decreased competition. In
addition, increased concentration can lead to
a situation where the public sector is forced to
“bail out” an institution that is large enough
to pose a systemic risk to the entire banking sys-
tem and economy. Similar situations occurred
in the United States during 2008; however,
Turkey differs from the United States in that a
large portion of its banking system is state-con-
trolled. Thus, the failure of private banks in
Turkey is not as great a threat to the system
as a whole, but the BRSAmust consider the sys-
temic risks associated with the potential failure
of large institutions.
Another trend that has developed in the
banking system following the 2000 and 2001
crises and restructuring efforts is a substantial
increase in foreign capital. Prior to 2001 the par-
ticipation of foreign banks in Turkey was
insignificant, but this changed as structural
changes to the banking system created more
attractive opportunities for foreign investors.
(Çimenog˘lu et al., p. 191) By December 2007,
nine of Turkey’s ten largest private banks had
some type of foreign interest in their capital
base. (Çimenog˘lu et al., p. 191) Increased par-
ticipation of foreign investors in Turkey’s bank-
ing system (and in other sectors of the economy
as well) is a result of improved financial sta-
bility and efforts of business representatives and
the government to promote openness and
encourage direct investment. This has allowed
for more efficient resolution of SDIF-controlled
banks as foreign bidders became significant
players in merger and acquisition activity.
Foreign investment should continue to fuel
growth in the banking sector and subsequently
the entire economy in the future, and the suc-
cess of efforts to privatize the state controlled
banks will undoubtedly be enhanced by the
availability of foreign capital. As of 2009, Vak-
ifbank and Halkbank shares have been pub-
licly floated, with approximately 30 percent of
each firm owned by investors outside the Turk-
ish government. (Erelçin) A second public offer-
ing is planned for each bank, and these offerings
will reduce the government’s share in each bank
to between 51 and 55 percent. (Erelçin) How-
ever, it appears that the government will retain
majority ownership (and thus operational con-
trol) of each bank for the foreseeable future.
In addition, Ziraatbank (the largest bank in
Turkey) provides a significant source of revenue
for Turkey’s treasury, making privatization in
the near term unlikely. (Erelçin)
Conclusion
Since the announcement of Turkey’s IMF-
supported disinflationary strategy in 1999, the
country’s banking sector has experienced major
crises, significant concentration, and important
regulatory changes. These changes have been
a result of the initial policies of the disinflation-
ary program, as well as part of the BRSA’s
response to the crises of 2000 and 2001. Prior
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to these crises, Turkish officials correctly iden-
tified several areas for improvement in banking
regulation. The formation and strengthening
of the BRSA, the adaptation of the laws and
policies governing the operation of the SDIF,
and the identification of issues with capital ade-
quacy laws were among the positive steps taken
prior to the crises. However, capital require-
ments for Turkish banks remained weak before
a serious effort was made to fully comply with
international standards as outlined by the Basel
Committee.
As a direct response to the 2000 and 2001
crises, the BRSA launched a restructuring
program aimed at recapitalizing and reform-
ing public and private banks in the system in
order to promote efficiency and competition.
The SDIF played a major role in this process
as it performed financial and operational
restructuring, merged many of the insolvent
institutions it seized, and was able to sell sev-
eral of the banks to outside parties.
However, the process of restructuring
insolvent banks in the banking system was
costly and not without problems, including legal
obstacles to forced liquidation; and this is a con-
cern for the BRSA in future situations. In addi-
tion, as Turkey continues its pursuit of EUmem-
bership, the BRSA will continue to play a
significant role as Turkey’s regulatory frame-
work, and the strength of its banking sector
must continue to meet EU directives. Also,
the potential for future consolidation and
increased concentration in the banking sector
exists, which could impact competition and the
amount of systemic risk associated with individ-
ual financial institutions. The existence of the
BRSA will allow for more effective management
of these potential issues as Turkey’s banking sec-
tor and the economy as a whole looks toward
the future.
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